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Abstract
The present paper studies and compares di¤erent vertical integration structures on
consumers and total surplus with licensing by mean of a xed fee in two successive
homogeneous-good Cournot duopolies where one of the rms in each market has a
di¤erent cost-reducing innovation. The key di¤erence between the present model and
models in the existing literature is that here we suppose the existence of two di¤erent
patents in upstream and downstream markets. In each market we nd two rms: the
patent holding rm and a non innovative rm. In upstream market, the innovative
rm owns an innovation allowing to reduce the input marginal production cost.
In downstream market the innovative rm owns an innovation allowing to reduce
marginal cost of transforming the input into output. We discuss di¤erent structures
of vertical integration and we show that consumer surplus and total surplus are
depending of cost-reducing innovation in upstream and downstream markets and
the structure of vertical integration.
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Introduction
According to OCDE report 1 , determining whether a merger will be likely
to promote or prevent innovation requires a complex, case-specic inquiry.
A merger could lead to e¢ ciencies in research and development, yet reduced
rivalry and greater market power could slow the post-merger rate of technolog-
ical change. Once an innovation is patented, the patent holding rm has three
di¤erent licensing regimes: xed fee which is not depending of the product
quantity, a per-unit royalty and an auction. In order to maximize its prot, an
innovative rm in successive markets can not only license its patent but also
try to integrate vertically. We can nd some examples in the economy like in
the air transport industry where we nd travel agencies in the downstream
market and rms responsible of catering and maintenance in the aircrafts. In
petroleum industry we nd oil stations in downstream markets and exploring
oil rms in the upstream market. Kamien and Tauman (1984,1986), Katz and
Shapiro (1986), Kamien and al (1992) and Wang (1998) compared di¤erent
patent licensing regimes and found many di¤erent results depending on the
position of the innovative rm : outsider or insider rm.Wang (1998) nds that
royalty licensing can be superior to xed-fee licensing for the patent-holding
rm when the cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic. Wang (2002) studied a
di¤erentiated Cournot model and nds that xed fee licensing contract is bet-
ter for consumer surplus then a royalty. Vishwasrao (2006) assembled a data
set of all foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufactur-
ing rms in placecountry-regionIndia between 1989 and 1993 and found that
licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively
high, while increased volatility of sales and greater protability favor xed fee
contracts. Sen (2002) considered a Cournot oligopoly with at least three rms,
where one of the rms has a cost-reducing innovation. He proposed a general
version of royalty contract, and show that this contract enables the innovator
rm to earn the monopoly prot with the reduced cost. Sen (2004) nds that
for an outsider innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing could be
superior to both xed fee and auction when the number of licenses can take
only integer values. Caballero, Moner and Sempere (2002) analyzed a multi-
stage non-cooperative game involving an outside patent-holder, who seeks to
licence a process innovation, and two price-setting rms located on a circum-
ference. They compared three licensing policies: an auction, a xed fee and a
per unit output royalty. They nd, contrary to standard results, that royalties
yield higher payo¤s to the patent-holder than do an auction policy or a xed
fee policy regardless of the size of the innovation. Sandonis and Fauli (2002)
characterized situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival
rm using two-part tari¤ contracts (a xed fee plus a linear per unit of output
royalty) reduces social welfare. Triest and Vis (2007) consider the relevant cash
1 OCDE (2007) Competition, Patents and Innovation
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ows that result from owning the patent and show that valuation of patents
on production process improvements cannot be done without good knowledge
of technology, markets and competitors. Encaoua and Lefouili (2006) investi-
gated the choice of an intellectual protection regime for a process innovation.
They found that choosing between patent and trade secrecy depends on patent
strength, cost of imitating a patented innovation relative to the cost of im-
itating a secret innovation, and the innovation size. Brocas (2003) analysed
a model in which two upstream innovators are investing to improve process
innovations used by two downstream producers. She found that when technolo-
gies are not costlessly substitutable, the prices of licenses rise with the size of
the switching costs. Buehler and Schmutzler (2007) examined the interplay of
endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream investment in
successive oligopoly. They found that vertical integration increases own invest-
ment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation e¤ect). Matsushima
(2004) investigated the location strategies of upstream and downstream rms
using a Hotelling-type product di¤erentiation model (linear city model). He
showed that more ine¢ cient transport technologies of upstream rms may en-
hance welfare and showed that vertical mergers occur if the transport costs
of upstream rms are large enough. Mukherjee and Zanchettin (2007) stud-
ied vertical integration and product innovation as interdependent strategic
choices of vertically related rms. They found that, although product di¤er-
entiation allows to soften product market competition and to avoid market
foreclosure, the downstream market may prefer less product di¤erentiation to
deter vertical integration. Mukherjee (2003) examined the incentive for licens-
ing in the downstream industry when the rms in the upstream industry have
market power. He shows that licensing in the downstream industry is prof-
itable if and only if licensing increases competition in the upstream industry.
Lemarie (2005) analysed a situation where a patent holder is considered as an
upstream rm who can license its innovation to some downstream companies
that compete on a nal market with di¤erentiated products. He shows that
a license based on a royalty works better with vertical integration, and that
consequently, the patent holder have some interest to vertically integrate if it
enables him to apply a royalty based license. He nds that the e¤ect of vertical
integration on the social surplus can be either positive or negative. Sandonis
and Fauli (2005) presented a model in which an independent research labo-
ratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry
that produces di¤erentiated goods. They show rst, that the vertical merger
is protable only in the case of small innovations, whereas a merger increases
welfare only for signicant innovations; second, all protable vertical mergers
reduce welfare. In this paper we analyse, in successive markets, situations of
vertical integration and process innovation in a model where we nd licensing
contracts in both upstream and downstream markets. The key di¤erence be-
tween the present model and models in the existing literature is that here we
suppose the existence of two di¤erent patents in upstream and downstream
markets and each patent holding rm can license its patent only in the market
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where its acting. In each market we nd two rms: the patent holding rm
and a non innovative rm. In the upstream market, the innovative rm owns
an innovation allowing to reduce the input marginal production cost. In the
downstream market the innovative rm owns an innovation allowing to reduce
marginal cost of transforming the input into output. We suppose that patent
holding rms use only xed fees licensing contracts. We study di¤erent forms
of vertical integration and we show that consumer surplus and total surplus are
depending of cost-reducing innovation in upstream and downstream markets.
We will analyse the case of non integration with no licensing contracts in
upstream and downstream markets, and then the cases of only one licensing
contract in the downstream or the upstream markets and last the case where
the two innovative rms license their two patents. Then we will analyse three
cases of vertical integration: vertical integration between only innovative rms
in upstream and downstream markets, vertical integration between only non
innovative rms in upstream and downstream markets and vertical integra-
tion between both innovative rms and non innovative rms. In which case,
we will compare consumer surplus and total surplus. We nd that when there
is no vertical integration, consumer surplus and total surplus are better when
non innovative rms in upstream and downstream markets benet from li-
censing contracts. When patent holding rms integrate vertically and the non
innovative rms integrate vertically too, consumer surplus is better when the
two innovations are licensed only when innovations are non drastic. If inno-
vations are drastic, consumer surplus is better when there are no licensing
contracts in upstream and downstream markets. When only patent holding
rms are vertically integrated, the two other non innovative rms are none
integrated, the licensing of the innovations in downstream and upstream mar-
kets is better for consumer surplus only when innovations are drastic. When
patent holding rms are not integrated and only non innovative rms are ver-
tically integrated, total surplus is better only when the two innovations are
licensed independently of their magnitudes and the consumer surplus is better
only when the two innovations are non drastic or intermediate
The paper is organised as follow. The model and game stages are presented in
section 2. We consider the case where rms in each successive market do not
vertically integrate in section 3. Then we discuss three structures of vertical
integration in section 4.
1 Model
We consider two downstream rms v1and v2 in a Cournot duopoly producing
homogeneous outputs q1and q2 and two upstream rms m1and m2 producing
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homogeneous inputs s1ands2. The (inverse) market demand function is given
by p = a Q, where p denotes price and Q represents industry output. With
the old technology, both downstream rms produce at constant unit produc-
tion costc. The cost-reducing innovation by rm v1 creates a new technology
that lowers its unit cost by the amount of " (0 < " < c). With the old tech-
nology, both upstream rms produce at constant unit production costd. The
cost-reducing innovation by rm m1 creates a new technology that lowers its
unit cost by the amount of (0 <  < d).
We suppose:
 Upstream rms sell inputs s1and s2to downstream rms at the price w
 Each downstream rm needs one unit of input to produce exactly one unit
of output
 Input producing cost d is less than its selling price w in the intermediate
market (d < w) and the price of the input and its transforming cost into
an output is less than the selling price of the output in the nal market
(w + c < a). We suppose consequently that c+ d < a
 Entry of new rms in the market is not protable
Figure 0 : Model
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A licensing game consists of three stages. In the rst stage, each patent-holding
rm acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting a xed licensing fee equal to the
di¤erence in prots of each non innovative rm without and with the use of
the new technology. In the second stage, each non innovative rm (the would-
be licensee) acts as a Stackelberg follower in deciding whether to accept the
o¤er from each patent holder (in the same market). In the third stage, the
two upstream rms engage in a noncooperative competition in quantities of
input and in the fourth and last stage, the two downstream rms engage in a
noncooperative competition in quantities of output.
2 Licensing contracts in downstream and upstream markets with-
out vertical integration
We start our analysis by considering the downstream Cournot duopoly where
patent holding rm v1has an unit output cost production of c   ", the non
innovative rm v2 has an unit output cost production of c when rm v2do not
benet from the innovation of rm v1 and has an unit output cost production
of c  " when it benets from a downstream license. In the upstream Cournot
duopoly, patent holding rm m1 has an unit input cost production of d   ,
the non innovative rm m2 has an unit input cost production of d when rm
m2do not benet from the innovation of rm m1 and has an unit output cost
production of d   when it benets from an upstream license.
Comparing the consumer surplus and the total surplus for the four possible
cases of licensing and no licensing in upstream and downstream markets, We
nd 2 :
No upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSPL_PL_m1_v1_m2_v2 =   172( 28 + 2"+ )(8 + 2"+ )
downstream licensing CSPL_F_m1_v1_m2_v2 =   118( 14 + ")(4 + ")
upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSF_PL_m1_v1_m2_v2 =   281( 19 + "+ 2)(8 + "+ 2)
downstream licensing CSF_F_m1_v1_m2_v2 =   481( 19 + 2"+ 2)(4 + "+ )
2 a = 6, b = 1, c = 1, d = 1, 0 < " < 1, 0 <  < 1
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Figure 1 : Consumer Surplus when no integration
Result 1
Consumer surplus is better when theres no vertical integration and when the
two innovations are licensed in the upstream and downstream markets. The
bad situation for consumers is when patent holding rms benets alone from
their innovations.
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Figure 2 : Total Surplus when no integration
Result 2
Total surplus is always better when there is no vertical integration and when
both innovations in downstream and upstream markets are licensed.
3 Licensing contracts in downstream and upstream markets with
vertical integration
In this section we examine di¤erent licensing cases with di¤erent structures of
vertical integration. We discuss three main structures:
 Vertical integration between innovative rms (m1,v1) in one hand and ver-
tical integration between non innovative rms (m2,v2) in the other hand
 Vertical integration between only innovative rms (m1,v1)
 Vertical integration between only non innovative rms (m2,v2)
For each vertical integration structure, we will compare four cases of licensing:
 No license in upstream market and no license in downstream market
 No license in upstream market and license in downstream market
 License in upstream market and no license in downstream market
 License in upstream market and license in downstream market
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3.1 Vertical integration between innovative rms and vertical inte-
gration between non innovative rms
We nd 3 :
No upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSPL_PL_m1v1_m2v2 =   172( 20 + 2"+ )(16 + 2"+ )
downstream licensing CSPL_F_m1v1_m2v2 =   118( 10 + 2"+ )(8 + 2"+ )
upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSF_PL_m1v1_m2v2 =   118( 10 + "+ 2)(8 + "+ 2)
downstream licensing CSF_F_m1v1_m2v2 =  29( 5 + "+ )(4 + "+ )
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Figure 3: Consumer Surplus for a m1v1  m2v2 integration
Result 3
When there are vertical integration between innovative rms and vertical in-
tegration between non innovative rms, consumer surplus is better if innova-
tions in upstream and downstream markets are not licensed and innovations
3 a = 6, b = 1, c = 1, d = 1, 0 < " < 1, 0 <  < 1
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are drastic. If innovations are non drastic, consumer surplus is better when in-
novations are licensed. When innovations are intermediate, surplus consumer
is better when only one innovation is licensed.
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Figure 4 : Total Surplus for a m1v1  m2v2 integration
Result 4
When there are vertical integration between innovative rms and vertical inte-
gration between non innovative rms, total surplus is always better when both
innovations are licensed
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3.2 Vertical integration between only innovative rms
We nd 4 :
No upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSPL_PL_m1v1_m2_v2 =   118( 10 + "+ )(8 + "+ )
downstream licensing CSPL_F_m1v1_m2_v2 =   1288( 44 + 7"+ 5)(28 + 7"+ 5)
upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSF_PL_m1v1_m2_v2 =   118( 10 + "+ 2)(8 + "+ 2)
downstream licensing CSF_F_m1v1_m2_v2 =  18( 8 + "+ )(4 + "+ )
0.5
epsilonegamma
1.0
1.0
4.0
4.2
4.4
0.5
0.0 0.0
Figure 5 : Consumer Surplus for a m1v1  m2   v2 integration
Result 5
When innovative rms integrate vertically while non innovative rms are not
integrated, consumer surplus is better if both innovations in downstream and
upstream markets are licensed and drastic. If innovations are not drastic, con-
sumer surplus is better when only upstream innovation is licensed.
4 a = 6, b = 1, c = 1, d = 1, 0 < " < 1, 0 <  < 1
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Figure 6 : Total Surplus for a m1v1  m2   v2 integration
Result 6
When innovative rms integrate vertically while non innovative rms are not
integrated, total surplus is better if only one downstream non drastic or in-
termediate innovation is licensed and if upstream innovation is non drastic.
If upstream innovation is intermediate or drastic and downstream innovation
is drastic, total surplus is better when both innovations in downstream and
upstream are licensed.
12
3.3 Vertical integration between only non innovative rms
We nd 5 :
No upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSPL_PL_m1_v1_m2v2 =   172( 22 + "+ )(14 + "+ )
downstream licensing CSPL_F_m1_v1_m2v2 =   1288( 44 + 7"+ 2)(28 + 7"+ 2)
upstream licensing
No downstream licensing CSF_PL_m1_v1_m2v2 =   1288( 44 + 2"+ 7)(28 + 2"+ 7)
downstream licensing CSF_F_m1_v1_m2v2 =   1288( 44 + 7"+ 7)(4 + "+ )
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Figure 7 : Consumer Surplus for a m1   v1  m2v2 integration
Result 7
When non innovative rms are vertically integrated while innovative rms are
not integrated, consumer surplus is better if both non drastic innovations are
licensed. If only one downstream (upstream) innovation is licensed, consumer
5 a = 6, b = 1, c = 1, d = 1, 0 < " < 1, 0 <  < 1
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surplus is better when downstream (upstream) innovation is drastic and up-
stream (downstream) innovation is intermediate.
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Figure 8 : Total Surplus for a m1   v1  m2v2 integration
Result 8
When non innovative rms are vertically integrated while innovative rms
are not integrated, total surplus is better when both upstream and downstream
innovations are licensed.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has studied and compared consumer surplus and total surplus in
di¤erent structures of vertical integration in two successive Cournot duopolies
where we nd in each duopoly one patent holding rm owning a cost reducing
innovation. The innovation of this paper is to treat the case where we nd two
di¤erent innovations in successive markets, as opposed to innovations in only
one market in existing literature. We show that the magnitude of innovations
in upstream and downstream markets and licensing decision by patent holding
rms have direct impact on consumer surplus and total surplus.
Appendix
We have : c1 = c  " , c2 = c , d1 = d   , d2 = d
Prots of downstream rms v1 and v2 are :
v1 = (p  c1   w)q1 and v2 = (p  c2   w)q2
Maximizing downstream prots of respectively rms v1 and v2 with respect to
q1 and q2 we nd8><>:
@v1
@q1
= 0
@v2
@q2
= 0
and
8><>:
@2v1
@q21
< 0
@2v2
@q22
< 0
q1 =
8><>:
a c+2" w
3b
if " < a  c  w
a c+" w
2b
if "  a  c  w
; q2 =
8><>:
a c " w
3b
if " < a  c  w
0 if "  a  c  w
Total demand of output in downstream market is z = q1 + q2, trying to write
w in function of z, we nd:
w =
8><>:
2(a c)+" 3bz
2
if " < bz
a  c+ "  2bz if "  bz
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Prots of upstream rms m1 and m2are:
m1 = (w   d1)s1 and m2 = (w   d2)s2
Maximizing prots of upstream rms m1 and m2 with respect to s1ands2, we
nd:
if " < b(s1 + s2)
s1 =
8><>:
2(a c)+" 2d+4
9b
if  < 2(a c)+" 2d
2
2(a c)+" 2d+2
6b
if   2(a c)+" 2d
2
and s2 =
8><>:
2(a c)+" 2d 2
9b
if  < 2(a c)+" 2d
2
0 if   2(a c)+" 2d
2
if "  b(s1 + s2)
s1 =
8><>:
a c+" d+2
6b
if  < a  c+ "  d
a c+" d+
4b
if   a  c+ "  d
and s2 =
8><>:
a c+" d 
6b
if  < a  c+ "  d
0 if   a  c+ "  d
Writing the equality between total o¤er of input by upstream rms and total
demand of input by downstream rms s1 + s2 = q1 + q2, we nd:
w =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
2(a c)+"+4d 2
6
if " < 4(a c) 4d+2
7
and if  < 2(a c)+" 2d
2
2(a c)+"+2d 2
4
if " < 2(a c) 2d+2
5
and if   2(a c)+" 2d
2
(a c)+"+2d 
3
if " < 2(a c) 2d+
4
and if  < a  c+ "  d
(a c)+"+d 
2
if " < a c d+
3
and if   a  c+ "  d
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